Political relations between Oman and United Nations p.8

FCO 8/1675 1971 Jan 01-1971 Dec 31
CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY
CYPHER CAT A

29 OCT 1971
FM MUSCAT 28 12 10Z

Nemils
CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 358 OF 28 OCTOBER 1971 INFO PRIORITY
BAHRAIN RESIDENCY SAVING ABU DHABI, DUBAI, BAHRAIN EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, BEIRUT AND NEW YORK,

| See minute
1. I MADE MY FIRST CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER YESTERDAY SINCE below. I think
HIS RETURN TO MUSCAT. HE WAS PERSONALLY AFFABLE AND RELAXED a brief Folter shed
BUT WHAT HE SAID PERHAPS DOES NOT BODE WELL FOR EASY RELATIONS hisseutto Muscatto
BETWEEN HIM AND THE SULTAN IN THE COMING MONTHS.

dew this pout
2. HE HAD SUBMITTED HIS RESIGNATION TO THE SULTAN AS MINISTER
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. HAVING TAKEN IT ON HIMSELF TO GET OMAN INTO
THE ARAB LEAGUE AND THE UNITED NATIONS HE FELT THAT HIS MISSION
WAS NOW ACCOMPLISHED, THOUGH HE HAD PREVIOUSLY INSTRUCTED AHMED
MACKI AT THE UN TO ABSTAIN ON THE US RESOLUTION CONCERNING CHINA

Ouainis wars
AND TAIWAN, THE SULTAN HAD INSTRUCTED MACKI TO VOTE WITH THE

ats out when
AMERICANS - APPARENTLY AS A RESULT OF US AND JAPANESE PRESSURE.

I vote was
MOREOVER THE SULTAN HAD MADE A NUMBER OF APPOINTMENTS, OF WHICH HE !+

in fact the

WHICH HE' taken

DISAPPROVED (INCLUDING A LEBANESE AS THE OMANI REPRESENTATIVE

IN BEIRUT - EVEN THOUGH LEBANON HAD NOT YET RECOGNISED OMAN -

SEEMINGLY AS A RESULT OF THE MACHI NATIONS OF ROBERT ANDERSON.)
3. HE WAS NOT AT ALL HAPPY WITH THE REPORT BY WHITEHEADS ON THE
ORGANISATION OF THE OMAN GOVERNMENT WHICH HE HAD COMMISSIONED.
IT APPEARED THAT THEY HAD LISTENED TO THE SULTAN'S VIEWS ON WHAT
THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE, WHEREAS HIS, TARIO'S VIEWS
WERE VERY DIFFERENT. HE WOULD HAVE TO CALL THE FIRM'S REPRESENTATIVE
TO GO OVER THE WHOLE QUESTION WITH HIM. IN ITS PRESENT FORM. HE
WOULD HAVE TO REJECT THE REPORT. -

CONFIDENTIAL