Suez Canal p.19

FO 1016/490 1956
TOP SECRET

-3

B.

ACHIEVEMENT OF OUR AIM BY MEANS SHORT OF WAR

10. Nasser is only likely to agree to international operation of theSuez Canal if in return he is offered a considerable quid pro quo whichhe could represent to Egypt and the Arab world as a victory for Arabnationalism. If he is not successful in this he is unlikely to remainin power. We have therefore considered the effects of our aim beingachieved without war under two headings:

(a)

If Nasser falls;

(b)

If he remains in power.

If Nasser falls

11. Egypt. A military junta is likely to remain in power. In the shortterm it would be much more moderate in its attitude to the West. Nevertheless,Egyptian aspirations to leadership of the Arab world would not be eradicatedand there is a danger that at some stage these will bring her once againinto conflict with Western interests.

12. Elsewhere. The Western position will be greatly strengthened, antiBritish activities will be greatly diminished and Soviet penetration mademore difficult. A more moderate Egyptian Government would reduce therisk of an Arab/Israel war.

If Nasser remains in power

13. A Western diplomatic victory backed by a continued demonstration ofAnglo/French ability to intervene militarily if Nasser breaks his word,may cause him to moderate his anti-Western activities for a short time.But this is likely to be little more than a breathing space in his policyof dominating the Middle East. He and Egypt would be dragged within theSoviet orbit. Arab xenophobia would also be intensified.

Effects on Iraq whatever may happen to Nasser

14. In either case in the short term Iraq's position would be considerablystrengthened. If Nasser disappears from the scene, Syria, Jordan and evenSaudi Arabia might be encouraged to turn to Iraq for Arab leadership.

Arab/Israel dispute

15. In either case, again, conditions would immediately be more favourablefor a settlement of the Arab/Israel dispute. But if no progress weremade towards this end Israel might be increasingly disposed to take the lawinto her own hands.

c.

HMG ACCEPTS A COMPROMISE SOLUTION

16. If HMG are forced to accept a bad compromise solution it would beconsidered by the Arabs as an overwhelming triumph for Nasser's policies.His claims to be the champion of the Arab cause would be immensely strengtheneaand the whole British position in the Middle East would be jeopardised.

...../Specifically.....

TOP SECRET