TOP SECRET ANNEX TO J.P. (53) 18 (FINAL) ATTACK AT SOURCE TO REDUCE THE THREAT TO SEA COMMUNICATIONS IN A WAR BEGINNING IN DECEMBER 1954 Introduction 1. The aim of this paper is to study the best methods of attacking target systems the destruction of which would reduce the threat to our sea communications in a war beginning in December 1954, and to indicate the priorities which should be accorded. 2. The study is primarily concerned with action which, if taken during the first month of war, would have an effect within the first two months. We have, however, also considered attack on target systems whose destruction would involve more delayed results. 3. Although we have taken into account the characteristics of both British and American forces and weapons as far as we know them, we have taken no account of their availability. It is, however, possible to draw a comparison between the number of sorties required and the 1,200 sorties which should be available from every hundred medium bombers in the first month of war. 4. Although the characteristics of forces and weapons are based on the assumed date, operations have been considered for any month of the year instead of being specifically confined to mid-winter. Target Systems Target Systems Selected as a Result of J.I.C. and J.I.B. Studies* 5. The target systems selected by the Joint Intelligence Committee for study by the Joint Intelligence Bureau were: - (a) Aircraft (i) aircraft at airfields (medium bombers and light bombers); (ii) aircraft under construction (medium bombers and light bombers); (iii) airfields from which medium bombers and naval light bombers would operate; (b) Submarines (i) submarines in their bases; (ii) submarines under construction at assembly yards; (iii) bases from which submarines would operate; (iv) mineable areas on submarine routes; (c) Surface Vessels (i) surface vessels in their bases: (ii) bases from which surface vessels would operate; (iii) mineable areas on surface vessel routes; (d) Communications (i) the Kiel Canal; (ii) the Belts and the Sound; (iii) the Trave-Elbe Canal; (iv) the Baltic-White Sea Canal; (e) Oil Production Additional Target Systems 6. The extent of the submarine and surface and, to a lesser extent, air threat to our sea communications would be largely determined by our ability to hold or at least to delay losing the exits to the Baltic. We think that the Russians would try to secure these exits in the early stages by amphibious attacks on the Danish * J.I.C. (52) 35 (Final) (Revise) of 6th January, 1953; T.A.B. 11/24 of 19th May, 1952; and T.A.B. 11/34 (undated) as amended for a date of December 1954. TOP SECRET 44898 B 2
