4 TOP SECRET Islands, Sweden and subsequently Norway and that amphibious attacks would be launched from a number of naval bases and other ports in the Baltic. We there fore consider that destruction of the invasion forces seen concentrating at their embarkation ports must be included in our study. 7. Furthermore, we believe that the Russians will correctly appreciate the extent of the atomic threat to their fleet and submarine bases, and that they will make every effort to work from dispersed areas and depot ships from the start of a war. We have therefore also considered attack upon fleet units, submarines and depot ships dispersed from their bases. Limitations of Certain Methods of Attack Attack by Carrier-borne Aircraft 8. We know that some United States carriers will carry atom bombs. Certain inland targets are within range of United States carrier-borne aircraft. Under operational conditions, however, we doubt whether their navigation and radar equipment are adequate for pinpoint targets far inland. Attack by Naval Forces other than Carrier Forces 9. Against certain targets, surface bombardment, underwater sneak attack and amphibious raids could achieve considerable results, but they would be limited by the absence of anything better than the conventional weapons available to them in 1954. They have not been included as recommended forms of attack in this paper as their success depends on the availability of detailed intelligence such as is unlikely to be available in the first month of war. Attacks by Clandestine and Special Air Service Forces 10. With the weapons likely to be available, clandestine and Special Air Service forces would suffer from the same limitations. None of the targets could be attacked by clandestine forces with any reasonable chance of success, and the only types of target which are suitable for attack by Special Air Service forces are air craft on the ground and canal locks. But the locks of the Baltic-White Sea Canal cannot be attacked by these means owing to the limited amount of darkness during the ice free months, and we have therefore recommended the use of Special Air Service forces as a possible method of attack against only one target system-aircraft on the ground. 11. It is essential to stress, however, that such operations could not be certain of achieving worthwhile results, and the recovery of the troops involved would call for a considerable effort, and probably rarely be achieved. We therefore think that Special Air Service forces should be used for this purpose only as a last resort. Priorities 12. In assessing priorities for attack, three assumptions have been made: - (a) that the Kiel Canal and the Trave-Elbe Canal would be temporarily blocked by orthodox demolition or by other methods; (b) that the majority of the large submarines would be based initially on northern ports and would be at sea on D day; (c) that the Russians would have attempted to disperse from their bases such submarines and surface ships as were not at sea on operations. 13. In the light of these assumptions, we have grouped targets in the following priorities but have not attempted to give an order of importance within each group. (a) First Priority (i) Destruction of Baltic bases for surface forces and submarines; (ii) Destruction of any amphibious forces seen to be concentrating in Baltic ports; (iii) Mining of the Sound and the Belts and of the Kattegat and (if prior demolition has failed) the western approaches to the Kiel Canal; TOP SECRET
