Military operations in central Oman

This file relates to the military operations and blockade in and around Jebel Akhdar. It contains correspondence concerning:

• The process and scope for reporting on the weekly progress of the Oman operations
• Summaries of Oman operations for the weeks ending 30 October, 1, 6, 13, 20 November, and 4, 11, 18 December 1958
• The deployment of the SAS to target the three principal rebel leaders (Operation Vector) and possibly capture the former Imam of Oman Ghalib Bin Ali Al Hina'i, the question of informing the Sultan of Muscat and Oman Saeed Bin Taimur and the importance of maintaining secrecy
• Peace approaches made by the rebels
• RAF and British army requirements and intelligence organisation
• Intelligence reports from RAF Intelligence Officer Flight Lieutenant E J Lagnado, including information that Sheikh Saleh Bin Isa Al Harithi urged Ghalib not to make peace with the Sultan but to seek mediation or support of Russia; reports on the movements and private life of Sheikh Sulaiman Bin Himyar Al Nabhani; the effects of air attacks; and the location of Ghalib
• The question of how much Colonel D de C Smiley should be told about why Operation Dermot was rejected
• The Muscat Minister of Interior's intention that pamphlets should be dropped to ensure that rebel rank and file know that their leaders are negotiating with the government
• Potential plans for British military reinforcements, and ministerial authorisation for certain actions
• The suspension of RAF activity while peace opportunities are explored
• The question of how British military information was leaked to a correspondent of the East African Standard
• The minutes of the 27th and 28th meetings of the Military Co-ordination Committee (Persian Gulf) held on 15 and 17 November 1958
• The need for more vehicles and accelerated secondment of officers for the Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF), including the Muscat Regiment
• The confidence of military success held by the RAF and British army and HMG's attitude towards peace negotiations between the Sultan and the rebels
• The resumption of active operations after Ghalib failed to respond to a leaflet drop asking rebel leaders to show a willingness to make peace
• A memorandum on psychological warfare in Oman, dated November 1958 and the text of several leaflets to be dropped on Jebel Akhdar; and W N Monteith's lack of confidence in the efficacy of this tactic
• British tactics for conducting negotiations with the rebels from a position of strength
• Monteith's struggle to get the Sultan to contribute more financially to the military operation
• The military planning and operations of the SAF, including Smiley's intention to launch a serious attack in December and Monteith's belief that capturing the mountain is imperative to maintaining a satisfactory outcome
• The concern of the Ruler of Sharjah Sheikh Saqr Bin Sultan Al Qasimi about the impact of the Oman conflict on the Trucial States, and his willingness to intercede as an intermediary; and the concern of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf G H Middleton about the advisability of adding another element into the Oman affair
• A letter from Sheikh Mohammad Bin Sulaiman Al Shamsi of the Al Bu Shamis near Buraimi, requesting money; and E F Henderson's consideration that the Sultan should do more to keep tribal leaders on side
• Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd's acknowledgement of US Secretary of State J F Dulles' concern about military operations
• A memorandum on the action in the event of a British soldier being reported as missing or in rebel hands.