SECRET more conveniently situated for this purpose makys ir than Bahrain, both because it to unnecessary to overfly Saudi Arabia and because it is slightly nearer to principal destinations in. East and Southern Africa; (iv) as a base for internal security operations in Muscat and Oman, 2. Masirah has considerable advantages over Bahrain and Sharjah for these tasks in addition to those mentioned in (iii) above) in that it is isolated and therefore out of the public eye. We have exclusive use of the airfield under the terms of the 99 year lease negotiated in 1958. Bahrain, on the other hand, has a civil airport and its military side is already over-crowded. It is already fully utilised as the base for our various commitments in the Gulf and it would in a Far East emergency have to take the full load of the reinforcement of that NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN theatre over the CENTO Route. We have to be careful to watch for the political repercussions or anything we wish to do there so as to avoid undermining the Ruler's position. 3. In addition we require an insurance against the complete loss of the use of Bahrain, as might well follow a change of regime there. Without the insurance provided by Masirah as an alternative link in the CENTO chain, the loss of Bahrain would deprive us of our only reliable route round Africa and the Middle East which we must keep open if we are to be able to reinforce the Far East and the Gulf. Sharjah does not provide the same advantages as Masirah as an alternative, SECRET because
