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latitude 17°N. to join and continue along the Violet Line of the Anglo-TurkishConvention of 1914.1)
26. In the north, the Saʻūdi 1935 Lines would cut off the territory of Qatarcompletely from that of Abu Dhabi, and would transfer from Qatar to SaʻūdiArabia an appreciable area of territory, geographically within the peninsula ofQatar. For the rest, the Saʻūdi 1935 Lines would extend Saʻūdi sovereignty, notonly over the whole of the great desert of the Rub al-Khāli, but well beyond itinto the natural hinterlands of the several Eastern States. On the other hand, itis noteworthy that the Saʻūdi 1935 Lines—which were described three monthslater as having been defined," after the most careful investigation into the actualsituation at the present moment”(2)—recognized that Liwa and the coast north ofLiwa, together with the intervening hinterland, belonged to Abu Dhabi. Moreover,under these 1935 Saʻūdi claims, the Saʻūdi frontier did not approach within 100miles of Buraimi. Finally, it is to be observed that, in the southern region, theSaʻūdi Government, for some 250 miles, incorporated in their frontier the Line laiddown in the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914.
27. Extensive as they were, the Saʻūdi claims did not seem to exclude thepossibility of an acceptable settlement of the frontier somewhere between the newSaʻūdi Lines and the Blue Line. Accordingly, the British Government, which hadpreviously been given careful consideration to the problem of the frontier, made animmediate response to the Saudi Memorandum, by offering a substantial amendment of the Blue Line, in order to take account of what seemed to be a genuineSaʻūdi interest to the east of that Line. This Saudi interest lay in the fact that therewere two Ikhwan settlements, Sikak and Anbak, some 35 miles to the east of theBlue Line. It was also thought not unreasonable that the Saʻūdi Governmentshould ask for the strip of coast between the Blue Line and the base of the Qatarpeninsula. The British offer, therefore, which was presented by the BritishAmbassador in an Aide Memoire, dated April 9, 1935(3), proposed a frontierrunning from the head of the bay, Dauhat as-Salwa a few miles in a south-easterlydirection, and then running almost due south as far as latitude 20°N., from whichit would join the Violet Line of the Anglo-Turkish Convention, at about latitude18°N. This Line, which is shown in green on Map B, conceded to Ibn Saʻūd a beltof territory to the east of the Blue Line, some 45 miles in width, and including thetwo Ikhwan settlements, as well as all the coast-line west of the Qatar peninsula.On the other hand, it left to Qatar all the Qatar peninsula and to Abu Dhabi theKhaur al-'Udaid and the well of Banaiyan to the south, which the British Government believed to belong to Abu Dhabi. The Saʻūdi Government made no commenton the British offer, until Fuad Bey Hamza, nearly three months later, again wentto London for conversations on various questions outstanding between the twoGovernments.
28. At the second series of London conversations between Fuad Bey Hamzaand Mr. Rendel, the question of the northern part of the frontier was discussedat some length at the first meeting on June 24, 1935, and again, very briefly, atfour further meetings.(4) Fuad Bey Hamza contended that the frontier definedin the British offer of April 9 was not based on any material facts, and that thewell of Banaiyan belonged to the Murrah tribe, who were claimed by King IbnSaʻūd. The Saʻūdi Government's proposals, on the other hand, formulated in itsMemorandum of April 3, were based, so Fuad Bey Hamza maintained, upon themost important factor in the desert-namely, the recognized grazing grounds(diras) of the various nomadic tribes. He also maintained that a decisive factor inthe desert area, to the south, must be the ownership of the wells, and claimed that,not only Banaiyan, but a string of wells from there, north-eastwards to Safaq,were owned by the Murrah, a Saʻūdi tribe. On being asked to provide more detailedinformation to substantiate his contentions in regard to the Saʻūdi proposals,Fuad Bey Hamza communicated to Mr. Rendel a Memorandum dated July 2,in justification of those proposals(5). Having regard to the enormously moreextensive claims made to-day by the Saʻūdi Government, it is important to observethat, in Fuad Bey Hamza's Memorandum the Saʻūdi Government insisted that the
(1) See paragraph 2 above.(2) See paragraph 28 below.(3) See Annex D, No. 10.(4) For the relevant extracts of the British record of these meetings see Annex D, No. 11.(5) See Annex D, No. 12.
