TOP SECRET 5. The Chiefs of Staff have stressed | that the assessment of force requirements and priorities for attack on the source of the threat to our sea communications would not imply that attack to reduce this particular threat would assume priority over attack to counter other threats. Assessment of such priorities would be a matter for later consideration. 6. We recommend that future action on this paper and in the determining of priorities should be: (a) to discuss this paper with the American Joint Chiefs of Staff; (b) to invite the Air Defence Committee to expand and bring up-to-date the existing study of the means whereby the air threat to the United Kingdom might be reduced by attack at source; subsequently, (c) to produce in consultation with the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, SACLANT and SACEUR a co-ordinated strategic bombing and minelaying plan; (d) to determine in the light of (c) above the employment of British medium bombers and minelaying forces. (Signed) R. W. CRADDOCK. F. J. ST. G. BRAITHWAITE. P. L. SAUMAREZ. Ministry of Defence, S.W.1, 24th September, 1953. I C.O.S. (52) 171st Meeting Item 3 of 16th December, 1952. Ś C.O.S. (51) 501 of 17th September, 1951. TOP SECRET
