-
8
-
Mr. Walmsley thought however that there were strong inherent
powers of resistance in Kuwait and that a coup would not be easy.
Sir Roger Stevens agreed and said that the two main dangers
were the death of the Ruler and the attractive power of the Arab
Federation, especially if Jordan and Saudi Arabia were to join.
Mr. Crawford said that the Sabah family were well entrenched
and some of the younger members were progressive. Although the
Kuwait Government had stated that they would not join the Federation
they had done so in a conciliatory way and they would try to
play along with it.
Mr. Talbot said that it would be unwise to encourage Kuwait
to join the Federation,
Mr. Walmsley said that a coup in Kuwait could be Kuwaiti
Nationalist; the danger would come in the first moments, either
from inside Kuwait or from outside intervention. If the first
reactions could be weathered the new regime might see that its
self interest called for continued Kuwaiti independence.
Mr. Talbot asked what implications for British preparedness
to intervene in Kuwait the success of the Arab Federation would
have.
Sir Roger Stevens said that the United Kingdom attached the
greatest importance to the independence of Kuwait and was bound by
the 1961 exchange of letters. It was difficult to forestall an
Iraqi occupation; our plans, based on this concept, had fitted
the circumstances of 1961, but might not apply so well now, when
the danger of an armed attack from Iraq seemed less likely, at
least for a time. Subversion was now more likely and more
difficult to deal with. The problem would be si mplified if the
Amir would allow us to station troops in Kuwait itself.
Mr. Walmsley said that the 1961 Exchange of Letters was
understood to refer only to external attack. We could only
intervene if the internal subversion were also linked with
external attack and of course if we also received the necessary
appeal.
Mr. Crawford said that until we saw how the Arab Federation
developed it would be very difficult to see the best way of
preserving Kuwait's independence, which relied on British military
and Egyptian political support, the withdrawal of which would be
awkward.
Sir Roger Stevens said that this question was constantly
under review; what he had said reflected our present thinking
which was going on all the time.
Mr. Crawford said that we had often looked for other methods
of ensuring Kuwaiti independence but had never succeeded. If
the Arab federation were established, the Sabah family, provided
they could get over the problem of joining a group of republics,
might be tempted to abandon our help and to rely on playing off
the opposing forces in the Federation. However there would
remain the risk that the Federation, if formed might break up,
with consequent disaster to Kuwait.
/Sir Roger Stevens
