SECRET APPENDIX 2 to ANNEX A to ACDS (Pol) 70/189 (Continued) a. That posed by Saudi Arabia against Abu Dhabi. b. That posed by Iran against Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah. 3. The forces of Saudi Arabia and their capabilities are described in Appendix 8. The problems with which they would be faced in any attack on Abu Dhabi would be the distances they would have to travel over very bad desert to reach their objectives, the resultant long lines of communication and the difficulties of providing air support at long range from the Lightning and F86 airfields. Nevertheless it is assessed that Saudi Arabia could mount an air-landed or parachute assault of battalion size, followed up by two battalions of the National Guard. SO. 4. The forces of Iran and their capabilities are described in Appendix 9. There is no doubt that Iran now has the capability to seize and hold the Tunbs and Abu Musa should she decide to do It is doubtful whether she would attack the islands if they were garrisoned or whether she would make any sort of attack against the mainland in the Lower Gulf in pursuit of her claims to the islands. Iran does, however, have the capability of mounting an air-landed or parachute assault of battalion group size with considerable ground attack support against Sharjah or Ras Al Khaimah. Local Forces 5. The Advisory Mission to the UAE, led by Major General Sir John Willoughby, recommended the following components of a UAE Defence Force: a. Sea Defence Force. 8 Medium-sized patrol craft, in addition to the 8 owned by Qatar and Abu Dhabi. 12 2 SECRET
